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CO-DETERMINATION IN WEST GERMANY-THROUGH
THE BEST (AND WORST) OF TIMES
BENJAMIN A. STREETER, III*
Frequently during the contemporary debate concerning the coun-
try's economic difficulties and possible methods for revitalizing ailing
sectors of the economy like the automobile and steel industries, atten-
tion focusses on methods for inducing greater cooperation between
management and labor. Even though this concern existed before the
latest recession, the economic dislocations caused by the recent down-
slide have accentuated the need for cooperation as troubled industries
seek substantial wage concessions from labor unions, more often than
not behind thinly-veiled threats of additional work force reductions.
Many different companies have introduced and experimented with in-
novative ideas and strategies, ranging from discussion groups for pro-
duction shifts to the election of Douglas Fraser, President of the United
Auto Workers, to Chrysler Corporation's board of directors.' Many of
these innovations were patterned after practices common to the econo-
mies of our major trading partners, including the members of the Euro-
pean Economic Community; some of these particular innovations have
often been admired in this country.
2
West Germany is widely recognized as a fertile source of these
innovations. The Federal Republic has long enjoyed a post-war tradi-
tion of co-determination, worker participation in corporate decision-
making, stemming from two major pieces of legislation whose scope
and coverage have been gradually expanded over the years: the Co-
Determination Act (Mitbestimmungsgesetz)3 and the Works Council
* Associate, Jenner & Block, Chicago, Illinois; B.A. with highest honors, James Madison
College of Michigan State University; J.D., University of Chicago; Member, District of Columbia
and Illinois Bar.
I. See generally, Worker Partlicpation in Corporate Government. The U... W- Chrysler Expe-
rience, 58 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 949 (1982).
2. See, e.g., id. at 971.
It just so happens, that if you look at the social history of the world, we learned from a
lot of other people. I look at the German situation where their labor unions have a very,
very meaningful role on a supervisory board. In fact, they're in a very strong minority
position. They just lack the deliberately designed board so that the management has a
majority of one. And then people, in Congress particularly, always marvel at the econ-
omy of Germany, and how stable it is, relatively speaking. Germany has a low inflation
rate and low unemployment. I can make the argument that a lot of that is due to the
meaningful role that the labor movement plays in Germany.
3. Gesetz Ober die Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer of May 4, 1976, Bundesgesetzblatt
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Act (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz).4 These statutes are the product of West
Germany's post-war socialist tradition and close cooperation between
the Social Democratic Party and the trade unions. German trade un-
ions attempted several times during the post-war period to expand co-
determination. However, these attempts to secure wider co-determina-
tion became successful only after the Social Democratic Party joined
the governing coalition in 1968. 5 The West German tradition of demo-
cratic socialism that made the expansion possible certainly is one not
shared in this country. Consequently, although certain principles and
ideas from each of these statutes may have been adopted in various
sectors of the American economy or have been the inspiration for vari-
ous experiments, the differing political milieu of the two countries
alone probably precludes the wholesale adoption in the United States
of German co-determination principles and works councils.
Nevertheless, these concepts warrant careful examination, espe-
cially as American employers adopt more innovative and flexible man-
agement arrangements in an attempt to enhance competitiveness and to
overcome seemingly intractable productivity problems. Although an
analysis of the total political environment in which the two German
statutes were enacted lies beyond the scope of the present article, an
exposition of the statutes' major provisions should provide some help-
ful background for Mr. Fraser's comments and highlight the forms of
West German worker participation. In addition, a short look at how
these forms of worker participation have actually reacted to West Ger-




The origins of German post-war co-determination are actually
British because the important steel and coal enterprises of the Ruhr
Valley are located in the old British occupation zone. The early forms
of co-determination were introduced in these industries. The British
BGB 1 I1153 (W. Ger.) [hereinafter cited as Co-Determination Law]. English translations of the
Co-Determination Law can be found in M. PELTZER, CO-DETERMINATION ACT (2d ed. 1976), or
D. HOFFMAN, THE GERMAN Co-DETERMINATION ACT 1976 (1976).
4. Betriebsverfassungsgesetz of Jan. 15, 1972, BGB 1 113 (W. Ger.) [hereinafter cited as
Works Council Act]. An English translation of the 1972 Works Council Act can be found in
GERMAN WORKS COUNCIL ACT 1972 (CCH) (H. Beinhauer trans. 1972).
5. Vorbrugg, Labor Particpation in German Companies and Its European Context, I I INT'L
LAW. 249, 255 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Vorbrugg].
CO-DETERMINATION IN WEST GERMANY
military government required that the coal and steel enterprises be con-
trolled by eleven-person boards composed of five shareholder repre-
sentatives and five employee representatives. The eleventh member,
the tie breaking chairman, was elected by the other ten.6 The British
system first implemented the principle of "parity" co-determination,
the equal representation of labor and shareholder interests on the gov-
erning board. Parity co-determination, as adopted in the coal and steel
industries, was retained in those industries when the first federal Co-
Determination Law of 1951, 7 the Aortan Act, was adopted after the
occupying forces had transferred power back to the West German fed-
eral government.8
This statute provided that German workers in the steel, iron, coal
and supporting industries would directly elect five of the eleven mem-
bers of each company's supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat). The Aufsicht-
srat, an institution peculiar to West Germany, reflected the strict
separation in German corporations between management boards, re-
sponsible for daily operations in discrete areas, and the supervisory
boards that are responsible for corporate-wide policy.9 The five em-
ployee Aufsichtsrat members exercised a voice equal to the five share-
holder representatives resulting in a system of parity co-determination.
The element of parity was further preserved by requiring all ten mem-
bers to select the chairman. Even though these particular industries
were heavily unionized at the time and the Mortan Act passed in large
measure because of union pressure, the 1951 Act required only that two
of the five employee seats be reserved for trade union members. Of the
remaining three seats, one went to a salaried employee, one to a blue
collar worker, and one to someone not connected with the union or the
corporation, often a professor or labor lawyer. 10 Thus, although organ-
ized trade unions were instrumental in obtaining the law's enactment,
the 1951 Act did not exclusively benefit trade union members by per-
mitting only their interests to be represented on the Aufsichtsrat. In the
coal and steel industries, the law ensured that the interests of non-pro-
duction workers such as clerical, supply and maintenance workers
could also be represented on the Aufsichtsrat.
The Aufsichtsrat is responsible for broad corporate policy. Under
6. Gruson & Meilicke, The New Co-Determination Law in Germany, 32 Bus. LAW. 571, 572
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Gruson & Meilickel.
7. Mitbestimmungsgesetz of May 21, 1951, BGBI I 347.
8. See generally Gruson & Meilicke, supra note 6, at 572.
9. Vorbrugg, supra note 5, at 253.
10. Comment, Co-Determination in West Germany, 51 OR. L. REV. 214, 215-16 (1971) [here-
inafter cited as Comment].
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the 1951 Act, this board was also responsible for appointing a three-
member managing board (Vorstand)."I This entity, in accordance with
Germany's two-tiered management system, was responsible for run-
ning each company on a day-to-day basis and addressing specific tech-
nical and scientific problems. The 1951 Act was careful to protect the
role of professional managers by mandating the use of a Vorstand, but
it did not require that any of the three Vorstand members be employ-
ees. The worker participation on the Aufsichtsrat or supervisory board
thus tended to be restricted to the policy-making level and did not im-
mediately lead to greater participation on the technical managing
boards. 12
Even though the initial co-determination arrangements provided
for parity employee representation on each Aufsichtsrat, subsequent at-
tempts to extend the parity principle were far less successful. For ex-
ample, a 1952 law1 3 permitted worker participation in a few industries
other than coal and steel, but allocated to employees only one-third of
the available seats on each Aufsichtsrat.14 This minor form of co-deter-
mination was made mandatory for German publicly-owned corpora-
tions, privately-owned companies and miners' unions with more than
500 employees.' 5 Labor unions and their close political allies, the So-
cial Democratic Party, spearheaded throughout the post-war period the
political effort to extend the principles of co-determination to new in-
dustries. These efforts continued throughout the decade of the 1970's
and eventually resulted in the 1976 Act.
The 1976 Co-Determination Law
The 1976 Co-Determination Law greatly expanded the number of
business entities that are ostensibly subject to the principle of parity co-
determination. The provisions of the Co-Determination Law now ap-
ply to most legal entities, including joint-stock companies (Aktiengesell-
schaft), limited liability companies (Gesellschaft mit beschrankter
Haftung), and partnerships limited by shares (Kommanditgesellschaft
aufAktien). t6 Generally, however, these business entities must employ
11. Id at 216.
12. Id at 217.
13. Betriebsverfassungsgesetz of Oct. 11, 1952, BGB! I 681.
14. Id. See generally Comment, supra note 9, at 217.
15. Woolridge, The System of Co-determination in Western Germany and its proposed reform,
5 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 19, 21 (1976). The statute excluded the coal, iron and steel industries. Id
at 37 n. 26.
16. Co-Determination Law, § 1(1).
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more than 2,000 employees.' 7 Excluded are entities already regulated
by other co-determination laws, such as the coal and steel industries
that still are subject to the 1951 act, as well as political or charitable
organizations, and news media organizations.'
8
Additional provisions define the applicability of the Co-Determi-
nation Law to special situations. For example, when entities subject to
the act are organized as a joint venture in the form of a limited partner-
ship, but the limited partners hold the majority of the shares of the
general partnership, then the employees of each limited partner are
treated as employees of the general partner to determine if total em-
ployees number more than 2,000; 19 if a limited partner is in turn the
general partner of a partnership, the employees of the limited partner
will be expanded to include the employees of each subsidiary limited
partner.20 Other sections specify the manner in which the employees of
subsidiary or controlled companies of other enterprises already subject
to the Co-Determination Law will be counted.
2'
Each enterprise subject to the Co-Determination Law is required
to create an Aufsichtsrat, if it does not already have one. 22 Each Auf
sichisrat has an equal number of shareholder and employee mem-
bers.23 The Co-Determination Law contains language specifying the
Aufsichtsrat's size, calculated on a sliding scale according to the
number of employees, and also specifies the proportion of union and
other employees entitled to sit on each supervisory board.24 An accom-
modation between the possibly divergent interests of organized and un-
organized workers is necessary in those enterprises where union
members do not constitute the entire work force. Office staff and cleri-
cal workers are entitled to vote directly for a number of electors pro-
portionate to their representation in the total work force. 25 The electors
shall in turn vote for the Aufsichtsrat members, unless the employees
choose to conduct direct elections.26 These arrangements suggest a leg-
17. Id




22. Id § 6(l).
23. Id § 7(1).
24. Id §§ 7(1) & 7(2). The Co-Determination Law provides that an Aufsichisrai containing
six to eight employee members must seat two union representatives, and a ten-member board
must seat three union members. Nothing in the Co-Determination Law interferes with the inter-
nal union procedures by which these union members are selected. The Law's intent to obviate the
possibility of union-dominated employee representatives is manifest.
25. Id § 11(2).
26. Id § 9(i).
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islative purpose, in spite of adverse union pressure, to prevent indus-
trial production workers from dominating completely the employee
Aufsichtsrat seats. Requiring proportional representation obviously
prevents the more numerous production workers in some firms from
easily blocking the election of any representatives from the clerical staff
minority. The Co-Determination Law thus recognizes that groups of
employees constitute separate interest groups according to their work
classification. Mandating a sliding quota of union Aufsichtsrat seats in
section 7 may, however, overstate union influence, especially in those
enterprises in which union members are only an insignificant percent-
age of the total work force. In all co-determination firms employees
vote for employee Aufsichtsrat members according to their job classifi-
cations; elections are held on a plant-by-plant basis with office staff and
industrial workers in the enterprises employing more than 8,000 em-
ployees required to vote for official employee electors, while the em-
ployees of smaller firms (those enterprises employing less than 8,000)27
vote directly for employee board members. The employees in these
smaller firms, however, may choose to use electors.
28
Perhaps even more surprising to American observers is the Co-
Determination Law's treatment of managerial employees. Because the
co-determination principle has primarily addressed the relationship be-
tween owners (i e., shareholders) and employees, the issue of how to
treat supervisory or other managerial personnel was not deemed criti-
cal. The specific interests of senior supervisory employees are probably
more closely identified with ownership interests, although the Co-De-
termination Law defines them as office staff.29 The Co-Determination
Law elects to treat senior supervisors as part of the office worker cate-
gory; the law also permits the senior supervisors to elect directly one
Aufsichtsrat elector, whenever the concern is large enough to justify the
allocation of more than nine employee seats to the Aufsichtsrat.30
Each of these provisions dilutes the influence of unionized indus-
trial workers on the Aufsichtsrat by reducing the number of seats avail-
able to trade union members. Union representatives must compete
with office staff representatives and senior supervisory employees on
the Aufsichisrat for recognition as spokespersons for the employees in
the enterprise. This dissection of "employee" points of view probably
dilutes employee influence on the Aufsichtsrat on many issues espe-
27. Id
28. Id § 9(2).
29. Id. § 3(3)(1).
30. Id § 11(2).
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cially since senior supervisors would probably identify with share-
holder interests, but one would still expect employee interests to
coincide on the most important issues.
The Co-Determination Law authorizes the Aufsichtsrat to appoint
a labor director (Arbeitsdirektor), who must be a member of the enter-
prise's Aufsichtsrat. Even though trade unions lobbied extensively for
the creation of this post, no formal requirement exists that the labor
director come from either the trade union ranks, the enterprise's other
employees, or from the office staff. The labor director exercises powers
and duties prescribed by the Co-Determination Law, as well as those
provided by other laws. 3' This official is regarded as a member of an
enterprise's management, similar to a Vorstand member. The Co-De-
termination Law requires that all the responsibilities for labor and so-
cial activities be concentrated in the duties of the labor director; these
responsibilities may not be diluted by delegating them to lower levels
of responsibility.32 As is true with the specialized managers appointed
to the Vorstand, divesting shareholders of the previously exclusive right
to appoint the labor and personnel manager constitutes a significant
gain of influence for employees of all enterprises. The act apparently is
a closer step toward the realization of German labor's long-term goal
of parity industrial democracy.
Constitutional Challenge
By mandating sweeping co-determination in a wide range of new
firms, the Co-Determination Law intended a wide readjustment of cor-
porate decisionmaking power. Consequently, it is not surprising that
the Co-Determination Law evoked strong opposition from business in-
terests who mounted a serious constitutional challenge.
In this constitutional challenge, a group of employer associations
attacked the Co-Determination Law on three separate grounds. They
alleged an abridgement of the constitutional protections accorded to
the rights of association and coalition,33 the freedom of choice of pro-
31. Labor Management Relations Act of 1952, BGBI I 681; Labor Management Relations
Act of 1972, BGBI 1 13.
32. See D. HOFFMANN, THE GERMAN Co-DETERMINATION ACT 1976 at 34 (1976).
33. Article 9 of the Basic Law provides:
The right to form associations to safeguard and improve working and economic condi-
tions is guaranteed to everyone and to all trades, occupations and professions. Agree-
ments which restrict or seek to impair this right shall be null and void; measures directed
to this end shall be illegal. Measures taken pursuant to Article 12a, to paragraphs (2)
and (3) of Article 35, to paragraph (4) of Article 87a, or to Article 91, may not be directed
against any industrial conflicts engaged in by associations within the meaning of the first
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fession, 34 and the preservation of property clause. 35 The German Fed-
eral Constitutional Court upheld the constitutionality of the Co-
Determination Law 36 and addressed both constitutional and prudential
considerations. The Court noted that the Co-Determination Law did
not grant employees the right to parity co-determination; 37 in actuality,
ultimate power to arbitrate disputes remained with shareholder inter-
ests. For example, the Court noted, in the event the Aufsichtsrat is un-
able to select its chairman by the required two-thirds first ballot vote,
with employees and shareholders voting their economic interests,
shareholders alone would be entitled to vote for the chairman on a sec-
ond ballot. 38 The importance of the chairmanship, of course, is based
in its statutory role in resolving Aufsichtsrat deadlocks. On a body
where opposing interests are equally represented under a system of par-
ity co-determination, some tie breaking mechanism is not only desira-
ble, but necessary to ensure that the enterprise can, in fact, resolve
internal policy disputes. The Co-Determination Law supplies this nec-
essary mechanism by permitting the Aufsich/srat chairman to cast a tie
breaking vote on the second ballot of any deadlocked issue.
39
As a consequence of this provision, employee Aufsichtsrat repre-
sentatives may find it extremely disadvantageous to resist stridently
certain proposals. If polarization in such circumstances increases the
likelihood that a board dispute will reach a second ballot, the employee
representatives may have very strong incentives to moderate their views
and reach negotiated accommodations of the dispute. In at least a few
instances, it appears that such a conciliatory process may have oc-
sentence of this paragraph in order to safeguard and improve working and economic
conditions.
GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 9, para. 3 (W. Ger. 1949, amended 1968). An English translation is
found in THE BASIC LAW (Federal Republic of Germany Press and Information Office trans.
1973).
34. Article 12 of the Basic Law provides:
All Germans shall have the right freely to choose their trade, occupation, or profession,
their place of work and their place of training. The practice of trades, occupations, and
professions may be regulated by or pursuant to a law.
GG art. 12, para. 1.
35. Article 14 of the Basic Law provides in part:
Property imposes duties. Its use should also serve the public well.
GG art. 14, para. 2.
36. A summary of the opinion of the Federal Constitutional Court of March 1979 appears in
Wiedemann, Co-determination by Workers in German Enterprises, 28 AM. J. OF COMP. L. 75, 88
app. (1980) [hereinafter cited as Opinion of the Court].
37. Id at 89.
38. Co-Determination Law, § 27(2). Note that although shareholders are given this specific
and exclusive power, their influence is diluted slightly by the corresponding power of employee
representatives to elect directly the deputy chairman.
39. Id § 29(2). The deputy chairman is not permitted to vote.
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curred.40 The Court held that the private property interests of share-
holders were not abrogated by the Co-Determination Law because the
Aufsichisrat structure ensured the preeminence of shareholder interests
with the tie breaking prominence of the chairman. Stockholders also
could not maintain, in the Court's view, their claim that the law uncon-
stitutionally halved their property rights because in actuality the chair-
man provision bestows upon shareholders a "determinative influence
in the enterprise."
'4'
The Court observed, moreover, that the Co-Determination Law's
actual effect was limited to defining the limits of property, a function
that legislative discretion traditionally exercises. 42 Possibly dispositive
for the Court was its observation that private property under West Ger-
man law has a social nature which varies according to the property's
social function and social impact.4 3 Apparently, in the area of co-de-
termination this social nature of private property outweighs the inter-
ests and private rights of the individual property owners (ie., the
shareholders), which in fact are not severely abridged. Needless to say,
this analysis is in many ways alien to our system of jurisprudence, espe-
cially in its emphasis on the social nature of property. Finally, the
Court upheld the Co-Determination Law against claimed violations of
the rights of free association and the freedom of occupation."
The employers' associations also argued that the Co-Determina-
tion Law interfered with industrial relations. In part, the associations
were concerned with the potential for severe conflict of interests be-
tween employee Aufsichisrat representatives and the unions.45 The
Court, however, rejected this challenge, reasoning that because em-
ployee Aufsichtsrat representation is actually less than parity, those em-
ployee members could not significantly interfere with the employer
associations that coordinate and conduct collective bargaining on be-
half of the firms. 46 Nor did the Court perceive any conflict of interest
resulting from employee Aufsichtsrat representatives' access to corpo-
rate books.47 To American observers, for whom conflict of interest
problems constitute some of the most vexing and obdurate obstacles to
40. See infra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
41. Opinion of the Court, supra note 37, at 90.
42. Id
43. Id
44. Id. at 91.
45. Similar concerns, of course, have also been raised concerning Mr. Fraser's service on the
Chrysler Board. See generally, Worker Particpation in Corporate Government. The UA. W-
Chrysler Experience, supra note 1, at 961.
46. Opinion of the Court, supra note 37, at 92.
47. Id.
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
an acceptance of the co-determination concept, the German Court's
dismissal of these issues is difficult to comprehend. This dismissal is
even more mystifying when one realizes the variety of business entities
to which the Co-Determination Law applies.
4 8
The German Co-Determination Law is very broad in terms of in-
tent, execution and application. Now that it has weathered a constitu-
tional challenge, the Co-Determination Law's broad strokes possibly
will significantly affect corporate decision making in West Germany.
Whether this impact has actually materialized will be discussed below.
Because many provisions are attributable to the influence of the social-
ist political tradition, this scheme of cooperative industrial decision-
making is not directly transferrable to our industrial system. Without
question, the major focus of the Co-Determination Law is parity par-
ticipation in corporate decision making. Although equal employee rep-
resentation on policy boards such as the Aufsichtsrai constitutes a
potentially significant development, one must question whether formal
structural mechanisms such as this provide needed worker input at the
possibly more critical lower levels of corporate operations. This spe-
cific need, one that many American firms now recognize, is addressed
by the Works Council Act.
THE WORKS COUNCIL ACT OF 1972
The other major source of employee participation in West German
industrial enterprises is the 1972 Works Council Act (Betriebsverfas-
sungsgesetz).4 9 First enacted in 1952, the Works Council Act in-
troduces co-determination principles at the shop level, as opposed to
the corporate boardroom. The 1972 Works Council Act also applies to
many smaller enterprises not subject to the 1976 Co-Determination
Law. Accordingly, the influence of the former on industrial relations
probably is far more pervasive than that of the latter. In all
probability, the Works Council Act contains provisions and innova-
tions that ultimately might prove to be quite significant in the democra-
tization of the American workplace. A close examination of the
provisions of this Act is certainly warranted.
The Works Council Act is universal in scope. Any enterprise (Be-
trieben) employing "as a rule" five or more employees shall elect works
councils. At least three of the enterprise's employees must be eligible
48. See supra text accompanying note 15.
49. See supra note 4. This law amends and extends the 1952 Works Council Act. See note
13 supra.
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as electors.50 The Works Council Act requires all works councils to
cooperate with employers for the welfare of "the employees and the
enterprise." 5' Trade unionism and the works council scheme appar-
ently coexist in the German workplace. 52 Where an enterprise has sev-
eral different plants or facilities, each facility is required to establish its
own works council if basic tests of distance and independence are satis-
fied; otherwise, the works council of the home plant or facility
controls.
53
Other provisions define which employees are eligible to serve on
the works councils. As is true with the Co-Determination Law, some
provision is made in the Works Council Act to provide for the propor-
tionate representation of different classifications of employees. Unlike
the Co-Determination Law, however, formal trade union organizations
do not benefit from these provisions. No works council seats are re-
served for union members; rather, only wage earners and salaried em-
ployees are entitled to reserved seats.54 The rationale for this limited
classification of employees probably lies in the political environment
underlying the passage of the laws, but the practical consequences of
this classification are negligible. Even if no formal trade union seats
are set aside on each works council, the councils are likely to include
trade union members. Normal union grievance procedures are also
still available, as are many specific arrangements established by indi-
vidual collective bargaining agreements. The mechanisms of the
Works Councils Act do not operate in a vacuum, but in an environ-
ment of preexisting union arrangements.
Part Four of the Works Council Act has the greatest impact upon
industrial relations. Works councils have been given the following
"general tasks":
1. to see to it that the laws, regulations, work safety rules, collective
bargaining agreements and labor-management contracts that are
in effect for the benefit of employees are observed;
2. to request the employer to take measures that are in the interests
of the enterprise and the employees;
3. to accept suggestions made by employees and the youth council
50. Works Council Act § I. See §§ 7-9 for the eligibility rules for election to a work council.
51. Id § 2(I).
52. The relationship between the Works Council Act and the formal trade unions are pre-
scribed in a number of sections scattered throughout the Act. See id §§ 2, 3, 14(7), 16(2), 17, 23,
31, 43, 48, 66 & 74. These provisions either allow union officials to participate in various limited
aspects of works council activities as union representatives or insulate union activity from works
council interference.
53. Id §4.
54. Id § 10.
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and, if they appear to be justified, to prevail upon the employer
to carry out the suggestions; it must inform the employees con-
cerned about the progress and the result of the negotiations;
4. to promote integration of severely disabled employees and other
persons requiring special protection;
5. to prepare and carry out the election of the youth council and to
cooperate closely with it in the task of promoting the interests of
juvenile employees; it may ask the youth council to submit its
proposals and views;
6. to promote employment of older persons in the enterprise;
7. to promote integration in the enterprise of foreign workers and to
foster understanding between them and German employees." 5
A common thread running through each of these goals is the idea that
the works council will serve as an advocate in a variety of matters for
employee interests or the interests of specific subgroups of employees
ranging from juvenile employees to older or foreign workers. Although
excluding issues of industrial relations that fall traditionally into the
scope of collective bargaining, the Works Council Act includes an
impressive variety of substantive areas, from the integration of handi-
capped, older and foreign workers to the active solicitation of employee
suggestions. In essence, the Works Council Act establishes a sanc-
tioned mechanism through which employee input and interests are
identified, encouraged and then forwarded on to corporate policy-
makers.
But the role of the works council is not limited to that of soliciting
and facilitating employee suggestions; the works councils are also
granted a specific, but limited, role in resolving policy issues and dis-
putes. Each works council may propose to the employer specific policy
proposals that the employer may accept, modify or reject. If rebuffed,
the works council may invoke additional mechanisms that might cause
its view to prevail. The mechanism employed in these circumstances is
the conciliation board, a review board one-half of whose members are
selected separately by the employer and the other half by the works
council.56 In addition, each side must agree mutually upon the concili-
ation board chairman.5 7 The conciliation board resolves, by majority
vote, appeals from disputes between the works council and the em-
ployer, with the chairman voting only as a tie breaker on a second bal-
lot. Unlike a co-determination supervisory board whose chairman is
selected by the shareholders,5 8 this tie breaking procedure does not
55. Id § 80.
56. Id § 76(2).
57. Id
58. Co-Determination Law § 27.
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favor automatically the employer's interests since the works council
conciliation board chairman will be selected by a neutral party, the fed-
eral labor court, if works council members and the employer are unable
to agree on a chairman.
5 9
A conciliation board decision creates a contract between the works
council and the employer that "shall be fulfilled by the employer unless
individual cases provide otherwise."'60 These conciliation board con-
tracts are enforceable at law. Normally the works council and the em-
ployer would respond to employee suggestions by agreeing upon
accommodations, which agreements will be formalized as contracts
binding both the works council and employer to its terms. The parties
should resort to the conciliation board only on a case-by-case basis
when they have reached an impasse after good faith negotiating. 6'
Generally speaking, of course, the influence and importance of any
body like a works council depend in large measure upon how smoothly
the council functions. Polarization of the sides could render the council
less effective.
Members of the works council are also responsible for facilitating
employees' efforts to exercise various rights that are granted them
under the Works Council Act. Among these rights are the right to in-
spect one's personnel file, 62 the right to lodge complaints63 and the right
to demand an explanation of how the employee is remunerated.
64
Works council members assist individual employees by accompanying
them to meetings and on inspection trips, much as union representa-
tives do in this country. The Works Council Act also requires the
works council to assist employees generally. Nonfrivolous complaints
received from employees must be investigated by the works council,
and the members of the council must attempt to prevail upon the em-
ployer to remedy the causes of the complaint, if justified.65 If employer
and works council cannot agree, the works council must appeal the
grievance to the conciliation board.
66
In addition to these specific provisions giving the works council a
direct role over particular issues that arise on a case-by-case basis, the
Works Council Act also lists a number of substantive areas in which
59. Works Council Act § 76(2).
60. Id § 77(1).
61. Id § 76(l).
62. Id § 83.
63. Id § 84.
64. Id § 82(2).
65. Id § 84.
66. Id § 85.
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
the works councils have been granted extensive and concrete co-deter-
mination rights. These co-determination rights are so extensive that
they deserve specific mention. They involve the following matters:
1. questions concerning the order of the enterprise and the behav-
ior of employees in that enterprise;
2. the beginning and end of daily working periods, including
breaks, as well as spreading the working period over individual
days of the week;
3. temporary reduction or increase of the working period normal
in the enterprise;
4. the time, place and method of payment of remuneration;
5. establishment of general vacation principles and the vacation
schedule as well as the timing of vacation of individual employ-
ees if employer and employees cannot agree;
6. introduction and application of devices designed to monitor be-
havior and efficiency of employees;
7. rules on the prevention of work-connected accidents and occu-
pational diseases as well as rules on health protection within the
scope of statutory provisions or rules on accident prevention;
8. the form, arrangement and administration of social benefits
whose range is restricted to the enterprise, organization or the
affiliated group of companies;
9. allocation of housing leased to employees on account of existing
employment contracts, termination of leases as well as the fixing
of general lease conditions;
10. questions involving the enterprise's remuneration system, par-
ticularly the establishment of principles for remuneration and
the introduction and application of new methods of remunera-
tion, as well as changes therein;
11. establishment of piece-rates and premiums and comparable pay
based on efficiency, including the money factor;
12. principles of the enterprise's suggestion system.
67
Very little imagination is necessary to realize the far-reaching extent of
these co-determination rights. Although they primarily pertain to very
modest areas of corporate administration, these areas are of direct and
immediate concern to most employees.
The importance of these provisions, however, fades into relative
insignificance as one considers the impact of a more important co-de-
termination right. The employer of an enterprise must inform the
works council when planning changes in the:
1. alteration, expansion and new construction of manufacturing,
administrative and other operational areas;
2. technical facilities;
3. working procedure and routine; or
67. Id § 87.
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4. jobs.68
The Act requires the employer to consult with the works council re-
garding the impact of these planned changes on employees. 69 Both
employer and works council shall give "due consideration to scientifi-
cally established principles of human engineering concerning a fair or-
ganization of work."' 70 Although the specific meaning of the phrase
"scientifically established principles of human engineering" is not im-
mediately clear, the term, at a minimum, serves the purpose of forcing
the employer and works council to attempt to articulate external and
objective justifications for the decisions they reach. Political horse-
trading and logrolling ostensibly will not suffice to justify works council
decisions regarding important changes in the structure of a work place.
In addition to these general provisions regarding the alteration of
working conditions, the Works Council Act gives employees protection
from arbitrary employer action. A works council must examine any
alteration in operations or the work environment that causes employees
to be "especially burdened" and are contrary to the "scientifically es-
tablished principles" in order to alleviate, if possible, these burdens. 71
As always, the failure of the works council and employer to reach an
agreement leads to the conciliation board's intervention.
72
"Alterations" in employment as used in section 90 may include
everything from special work arrangements and shifts to plant expan-
sions and plant closings. Indeed, a vast range of corporate changes fall
within this section. Employees thus are ensured of some notice and
formalized input into major alteration decisions. But the greatest pro-
tection for employees from major structural changes in the enterprise
appears in section 1 11 of the Works Council Act that requires employ-
ers, within a reasonable time, to inform the works council "in detail
about planned structural changes in the enterprise which may result in
considerable disadvantages for the work force, or significant part of the
work force . . . . 73 One is hard pressed to imagine a clearer obliga-
tion. "Structural changes" include all of the following:
1. reduction and shutdown of the entire enterprise or significant
part of the enterprise;
2. relocation of the entire enterprise or significant part of the
enterprise;
68. Id § 90.
69. Id
70. Id
71. Id § 91.
72. Id
73. Id § 111.
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3. merger with other enterprises;
4. fundamental changes in the organization of the enterprise, the
purpose of the enterprise or facilities of the enterprises;
5. introduction of fundamentally new working and production
methods.
74
Although management's power to force changes like these remains un-
fettered, workers now receive notice and some input. The Works
Council Act also encourages employers and workers to negotiate agree-
ments pertaining to the planned structural changes in the enterprises
and to agree to a "social plan" that outlines these agreements. 75 An-
other section imposes various sanctions, including the award of dam-
ages, that employees may invoke should an employer fail to comply
with a negotiated social plan.
76
A variety of corporate decisions can have a "special burden" on
the employees of a specific plant. In one of the more traumatic exam-
ples, the complete shutdown of a plant utilizing obsolete technology, a
works council might be expected to oppose vigorously the shutdown.
While no evidence exists at this point to indicate that a works council
has successfully blocked a plant shutdown, enterprises probably have
paid new attention to the social consequences of what had previously
been regarded as purely economic corporate decisions. A concrete ex-
ample occurred when Volkswagen was planning to open up its Ameri-
can production facility presently located in New Stanton,
Pennsylvania. This new development, of course, resulted in the expor-
tation of West German production jobs to American workers. The
German workers, through the works council at Volkswagen, minimized
the impact of the German loss of jobs by delaying the construction of
the new plant for two years. Volkswagen also agreed to minimize the
impact of this alteration on its German workforce by limiting its Amer-
ican plant to final production only while continuing to produce all
parts at German plants for shipment to the American facility.77
The Works Council Act also delegates to the works councils a spe-
cific role in personnel and employment policies, down to the level of
intervening in individual personnel decisions. Essentially, the Act
gives the works council the right to receive notification before certain
personnel actions are taken, as well as the right to oppose actively the
proposed actions. The works council must be given notice of personnel
74. Id
75. Id § 112.
76. Id. § 113.
77. See supra, Gruson & Meilicke, note 6, pp. 572-73.
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planning,78 the classification, reclassification and transfer of employ-
ees, 79 tentative personnel matters,80 and dismissals.8' In the majority of
these specific instances, the works council may object to the proposed
personnel decisions, with the possibility that it will invoke conciliation
board procedures if compromises cannot be reached with the employer.
In addition, works councils will consult with employers in matters of
work safety,82 the development of job application forms,83 and provid-
ing vocational training.
8 4
Among the most important provisions of the Works Council Act
are those affecting so-called economic matters. These provisions 5 have
had the effect of introducing worker participation into several areas
formally reserved for the employer only. For example, an economic
committee is established in all concerns hiring more than one hundred
employees.86 This committee is composed of three to seven members,
including a works council member.8 7 As a reflection of the particular
and specialized importance of this committee, its members should pos-
sess "the professional and personal qualifications required for the per-
formance of their duties."88 This specific requirement is not found
elsewhere in the Works Council Act. The economic committee is in-
tended to be a committee of professionals. And well it should be. Em-
ployers are required to inform the economic committees, with
necessary and adequate documentation, of all the following matters:
1. the economic and financial situation of the enterprise;
2. the production and sales situation;
3. the production and investment program;
4. planned rationalization measures;
5. production and working methods, particularly the introduction
of new working methods;
6. the reduction or shutdown of enterprises or parts of enterprises;
7. the relocation of enterprises or parts of enterprises;
8. the merger of enterprises;
9. changes in the organization or purpose of the enterprise; as well
as
10. other actions or plans which vitally may affect the interests of
78. Works Council Act § 92(1).
79. Id § 99.
80. Id § 100.
81. Id § 102.
82. Id § 89.
83. Id § 94.
84. Id § 96.
85. Id §§ 106-113.
86. Id. § 106(1).
87. Id § 107.
88. Id
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the employees of the enterprise.89
Unlike the managerial subcommittees of an Aufsichtsrat, the economic
committee has no independent policymaking role. Its most important
function is to disseminate technical information, educate and advise the
works council. Apparently, in recognition of the probability that em-
ployees will lack the requisite backgrounds to make informed choices
regarding the major economic decisions facing the enterprise, the Ger-
man legislature created the special technical committees and endowed
them with sufficient authority to compel from the employer the disclo-
sure of necessary, but critical technical and economic information.
With technical assistance such as this and its broad legislative mandate,
the works council can potentially wield great influence over industrial
concerns.
CO-DETERMINATION IN CHANGING ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
In the last few years definite signs have appeared that the West
German post-war Wirtschaftswunder, or economic miracle, has begun
to diminish. Economic growth rates of close to 12% per annum have
fallen to 4%.90 Although the German economy consistently has out-
performed its European Common Market partners in the last decade,
the spirit of cooperation and common sense (Vernunft) that has charac-
terized German industrial relations during this period has deteriorated.
The positions of management and labor in many instances have po-
larized, leading to strikes or plant shutdowns. A few concrete examples
of recent labor industrial disputes and developments may illustrate the
pressures to which co-determination in Germany has been subjected in
an increasingly troubled economy.
As an initial indication, fewer West German firms than expected
have actually fallen subject to the new Co-Determination Law. Of the
expected 650 firms, almost one-third altered their corporate structures
or operations (often through the establishment of subsidiaries or hold-
ing companies), creating ostensibly autonomous divisions that employ
fewer than 2,000 employees, the threshold level established by the Co-
Determination Law. Only 450 West German corporations have fallen
within the ambit of the Co-Determination Law.9' That so many firms
have attempted to evade the new law manifests the corporations' fun-
damental mistrust of the extension of the Mibestimmungs principle.
89. Id § 106(3).
90. ECONOMIST, Nov. 8, 1980, at 40.
91. DUN'S REV., July, 1979, at 53.
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These attempts to escape the provisions of the Co-Determinaton Law
by changes in corporate structure have not gone unchallenged, how-
ever. Labor has initiated a court challenge to these efforts.
92
Although the Co-Determination Law has been anathema to some,
to other corporations it actually represents a rare opportunity. The cor-
porations that must comply with the more restrictive Montan form of
parity co-determination have displayed a unique interest in the new
act. For example, Mannesman, a West German steel pipe and indus-
trial equipment manufacturer, proposed a plan to realign its corporate
structure by merging its steelmaking division into its pipe making sub-
sidiary. If successful, the parent corporation would no longer be sub-
ject to the strictest parity form of co-determination since the majority of
the parent division's sales would not derive specifically from steel pro-
duction. The new subsidiary (combined steel and pipe making) would,
of course, be large enough to be subject to the Co-Determination Law,
but the pipe making component would predominate over steel produc-
tion so that Montan parity co-determination would not be required.
93
The goal of this plan is thus to diminish employee Aufsichtsrat repre-
sentation by "trading in" Montan co-determination for less restrictive
co-determination.
Of particular interest is the role played by the labor representatives
on Mannesman's board during these maneuvers. Although holding ab-
solute parity on the Mannesman board, the labor representatives have
been impotent to prevent the change. Mannesman's chairman of the
board forced the union representatives to accede to the proposed trans-
fer by threatening to seek shareholder approval of the restructuring
plan,94 thus circumventing the Aufsichtsrat. If such a maneuver is
widely resorted to, there seems little doubt that the interests of capital
will in most instances continue to predominate. Fundamental policy
disputes between shareholder interests and labor interests may always
be resolved in favor of shareholders. Labor's interests probably can
best be served by avoiding divisive votes and by seeking compromises.
Ultimately, evasions of parity co-determination like this could be lim-
ited only by a legislative prohibition. Such legislation was introduced
by the union-backed Social Democratic Party and the business-ori-
ented Free Democrats to prohibit such transformations, but only for a
period of six years.95
92. Id.
93. Bus. WK., Nov. 24, 1980, at 58.
94. Id
95. Bus. WK., March 9, 1981, at 68.
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Certainly, business attempts to escape parity co-determination
clash directly with labor's desire to extend parity co-determination
across the entire spectrum of the German economy.96 Labor has un-
derstandably been less than enthused about the limitations on its abil-
ity to select the chairman of the Aufsichtsrat. On the other hand, labor
itself has been criticized for its increased proclivity for bloc voting in
those firms subject to co-determination. 97
In another situation, the labor directors of Hoesch, a German steel
manufacturer subject to parity co-determination, agreed to the loss of
almost 4,200 jobs at Dortmund in connection with the construction of a
new, technologically efficient oxygen steel plant that would have re-
placed a nineteenth century facility. But when the EEC cartel imposed
production cuts upon European steelmakers, Hoesch was forced to can-
cel the new facility, even though the remaining Hoesch workers ac-
tively supported the facility and the opportunity to learn more
advanced methods of steel production:
The gloomy logic of all this angers 25,000 Dortmund steelworkers.
They had already agreed to the loss of 4,200 jobs with the building of
the more modern plant. Now they fear that a further 5,000 will go as
Dortmund becomes just a roller of steel cast on the Rhine .... 98
Employee representation on a supervisory board undoubtedly does
help employees obtain some access to and provide input into a corpora-
tion's decisionmaking. Such representation does not necessarily en-
sure, as the Hoesch example illustrates, that ultimately workers'
interests will be zealously guarded. Indeed, the lesson of the Hoesch
situation is that even parity co-determination cannot ensure the preser-
vation of important worker interests like job security and the introduc-
tion of advanced production methods.
Any attempt now to evaluate conclusively the new Co-Determina-
tion Law's impact upon West Germany's ongoing experiment with co-
determination would be premature. Although several years have al-
ready passed since the Law was passed, its full impact cannot yet be
fully assessed, except to note instances such as those cited above in
which the interests of capital have tended to outweigh employee inter-
ests. In a view that has been reiterated by many West German political
figures, "Mitbestimmung is at the heart of German social peace and
industrial progress." 99 The central issue is whether Aitbestimmung will
96. Id at 73.
97. Id
98. Thunder over the Ruhr after EEC steel storm, ECONOMIST, February 28, 1977, at 26.
99. ConcernedAction, ECONOMIST, February 28, 1977, at 26.
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continue to be the key for social harmony. In a declining economy, the
danger is very strong that the promise of co-determination will become
the shoals on which the expectations of German labor flounders. La-
bor must be mindful of the limits inherent to the Aufsichtsrat; no 4uf
sichisrat is likely to endorse policies that will dissipate or diminish
capital. Perhaps a more realistic attitude for labor is to maximize
worker input into everyday operations as opposed to the continued em-
phasis on attempts to increase labor's control over capital. Other, pos-
sibly hidden, dangers exist. For example:
The [co-determination] system could also alienate workers who, with
good reason, fail to understand it, for the suspicion may grow that
behind all the complexities [of the new act] a new power block, made
up of managers, shareholders and a worker's elite will be created. It
is often said with pride that the distinction between white and blue
collar workers is on the way out. But that may also mean a new
inequality less immediately apparent-between those who can make
their way forward in an established, conformist system and those
who either cannot or who remain outside it.'0o
The resolution of these and other issues may ultimately disappoint the
expectations of many of the interests who have long supported the con-
cept of co-determination. But even as the bulk of attention will be di-
rected to the question of co-determination in corporate governance, the
most lasting impact of workers over corporate governance may well
occur through the mechanisms of the Works Council Act. Thus, the
influence of the Works Council Act ultimately deserves the closest ob-
servation in this country.
CONCLUSION
Employee participation in corporate governance is encouraged by
both the Co-Determination Law and the Works Council Act. As stated
earlier, each of these acts has increased worker input into the produc-
tive process but has proven inadequate to fully protect employees' in-
terests during periods of economic difficulty. American observers will
differ on the viability of adopting variations of these German innova-
tions in the American workplace. Although individual variations
might be adopted on a trial basis, it seems clear that no panaceas will
be found.
American observers must also be careful to examine the possible
influence of these German innovations upon other worker participation
developments. For example, a union director or works council may be
100. Id
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unnecessary in a corporation in which the employees already own a
sizable, if not significant proportion, of the common stock gained
through a profit sharing or stock option plan. In any event, the field for
innovative experimentation in expanding the participation of American
workers seems wide open.
